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BYTE MARKS: MAKING SENSE OF NEW F.R.C.P. 37(e)
Charles Yablon•
Abstract
New FRCP 37(e) limits severe, case ending sanctions for lost
electronically stored information (ESI) to situations where a party acted
with "intent to deprive" other parties of the use of that information. But
it makes no change in existing preservation duties and never explains how
"intent" is to be determined for the corporation and other entities likely
to be parties in such litigation. The question is-does this Rule make any
sense? This Essay seeks to make sense of Rule 37(e) in terms of its
language, the stated goals of its drafters, and its role in the regulation of
current litigation practice. It argues that Rule 37(e) is best understood as
an attempt to clarify the risk assessments made by corporate agents
supervising ESI preservation and discovery efforts. The Rule seeks to
provide assurance that their actions (and inactions), if they are reasonable
and without malevolent intent, will not subject the company to severe
sanctions. This Essay also shows, however, that to provide the proper
incentives, the Rule must also be interpreted to permit courts to impose
severe sanctions for egregious and systematic ESI loss, even if caused by
managerial inaction and even if proven circumstantially without direct
evidence of culpable intent. It contains an extended analysis of CAT3
LLC, an important case decided under the new Rule, which illustrates
some of these points. Finally, drawing from analogous corporate law
cases involving managerial duties to monitor employee misconduct, this
Essay argues that federal courts can and should, consistent with Rule
37(e), find that there is a duty on many corporate parties to implement
and maintain a reasonable system of information governance and ESI
retention, and that a conscious decision not to do so can give rise to severe
penalties under the new Rule.
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INTRODUCTION

Like other procedural conflicts primarily affecting big asymmetric
litigation, 1 the battle over new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) was
long, hard fought, and resolved in a way that allowed both sides to claim
victory. Corporate defendants sought relief from what they decried as the
ever-increasing burden of"over-preservation." Plaintiffs' representatives
saw the proposed rule as an invitation to spoliate and pushed back hard.
What resulted is a Rule that does not change existing obligations to
preserve electronically stored information (ESI)2 but restricts imposition
of the most severe sanctions for lost ESI to cases where "the party acted
with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the
litigation. "3 Corporate defendants could claim victory because the new
Rule resolved a serious circuit split in their favor and also provided an
acknowledgment that "reasonable steps" to preserve suffice. 4 Plaintiffs'
representatives could point to the fact that legal preservation duties
remained unchanged and, although the severest sanctions were off the
table, the Rule "preserved the rights of district court judges to remedy the
negligent spoliation of evidence." 5
When great partisan battles are taking place concerning the future of
civil litigation, it sometimes behooves the careful legal analyst to emulate
Switzerland-try to stay neutral and hide behind large mountains. 6
Litigation is one of the primary vehicles for regulating corporate conduct
in contemporary America. Both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys play
vital roles in threatening, pressuring, cajoling, and advising corporate
managers to do the right (or at least the legal) thing. Accordingly, it is
difficult to support procedural rule changes that make successful
litigation against corporate defendants either too easy or too difficult to
achieve. Rather than critique new Rule 37(e) as either doing too much or
I. On the effect of asymmetric litigation on discovery rules, see Charles Yablon & Nick
Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the Resolution ofDiscovery
Disputes in an Age ofEver-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 72&-27 (2012).
2. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("Rule
37(e) ...does not attempt to create a new duty to preserve.").
3. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e).
4. CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MlNuTES: APRIL 10--11, 2014, at 23 (2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defaulUfiles/fr_import/CV04-2014-min.pdf.
5. John W. Griffin Jr., A Voice for Injured Plaintiffs, 51 TRIAL 16, 20, 22 (2015).
6. The "mountains" in this case consist of prior case law.
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not enough for its proponents, this Essay will focus on a more current and
important question. Does new Rule 37(e) make any sense?
The problem, in a word, is intent. Rule 37(e) purports to draw a bright
line between less and more sanctionable forms of ESI destruction based
on the parties' intent. But the parties most likely to be subject to such
sanctions are corporations and other business entities whose intent must
be inferred from the thoughts and actions of their agents, and the legal
rules for doing so are frequently obscure and inconsistent. This Essay
aims to make sense of Rule 37(e) by articulating a clear and consistent
framework for understanding "intent" in the context of business entities'
ESI preservation and destruction, so Rule 37(e) is coherently applicable
in accordance with its objectives.
Neither the Rule itself nor the Advisory Committee Note has much to
say on this issue. The long, convoluted, but extremely interesting history
of new Rule 37(e) is outside the scope of this Essay. 7 Suffice it to say that
the Advisory Committee hotly debated the proposed revisions to the Rule
and concluded with a surprise overnight change to the Rule at the April
10-11 Advisory Committee meeting in Portland, Oregon. 8 Professor
Thomas Allman has described the revised and shortened Rule as a "rifle
shot" aimed solely at rejecting prior case law that permitted the
imposition of severe sanctions for negligently lost ESI. 9 The new Rule,
which requires "intent to deprive," replaces prior drafts that required
spoliative actions to be "willful or [in] bad faith." 10
The purpose of new Rule 37(e), as actually enacted, remains obscure.
The new Rule creates greater uniformity, but only with regard to ESI and
only in prescribing when courts may impose the most severe sanctions.
So is new Rule 37(e) a victory for corporate defendants in their
continuing efforts to reduce the costs and dangers of litigation? Is it a
pyrrhic victory, which gives corporate defendants some limited and
largely illusory protection against the most severe sanctions but does not
seriously change the status quo? Or is it just an incoherent mess?
This Essay seeks to make sense of Rule 37(e) in terms of its language,
the stated goals of its drafters, and its role in the regulation of current
7. For a first-hand account ofthis history, see TuOMAS Y. ALLMAN, THE 2015 CIVIL RULES
PACK.AGE AS APPROVED BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3--4 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/darn/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015-sac/written_materials/5_I_20 I 5_summary_
of_rule__package.authcheckdam.pdf(examining the history of Rule 37(e)).
8. The Committee approved the Rule with a note to be added later. Michele Lange, FRCP
Amendments: The long and Winding Road, EDISCOVERY BLOG (Apr. 2 I, 20I 4), http://www. theedisc
overyblog.com/2014/04/2 I /frcp-amendments-long-winding-road/.
9. TuOMAS Y. ALLMAN, RULE 37(E): THE REPORT FROM PORTLAND I (2014),
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/allman_rule_37e_the_report_from__portland_4.1
4.14.pdf.
10. ALLMAN, supra note 7, at 16---17.
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litigation practice. It argues that Rule 37(e) is best understood as an
attempt to clarify the risk assessments made by corporate agents
supervising ESI preservation and discovery efforts. The Rule seeks to
provide assurance that their actions (and inactions), if reasonable and
without culpable intent, will not subject the company to severe
sanctions. 11 To provide the proper incentives, however, the Rule must
also be interpreted to permit severe sanctions for egregious and
systematic ESI loss, even in cases of managerial inaction and even
without direct evidence of culpable intent. Drawing upon analogous
corporate law cases involving managerial duties to monitor employee
misconduct, this Essay also argues that federal courts could, consistently
with Rule 37(e), impose sanctions on corporate parties for failure to
implement and maintain a reasonable system of information governance
and ESI retention.

I.

THE PROBLEM OF "OVER-PRESERVATION"

A stated reason for revising Rule 37(e) was the perceived problem of
costly ESI "over-preservation." 12 It is unclear to what degree the new
Rule, as actually enacted, seeks to address that problem. "Over
preservation" is a somewhat imprecise and loaded term that may refer to
a number of different types of expenditures. 13 It is therefore useful to
consider precisely what sorts of expenditures might be considered costs
of "over-preservation."

A. Storage Costs
It is natural to think of preservation as the actual cost of storing old
and otherwise unnecessary files, creating back-up tapes, and not erasing
otherwise reusable ESI systems. 14 Yet the actual costs ofESI storage are
small and getting smaller. 15 Accordingly, there is less and less need to
11. CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 4.
12. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules
of Civil Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure (June 14, 2014), www.uscourts.gov/file/l8218/download.
13. Id.
14. The advisory committee said "technical and business needs" required the "safe harbor"
created by Rule 37(1) in 2006. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(t) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2006 amendment included saving storage costs by using
"programs that recycle storage media" Memorandum from Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 27, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/l4746/
download.
15. Advances like cloud computing continue to reduce storage costs about 50% every eighteen
months. AMIT KUMAR DUTTA & RAGIB HASAN, How MUCH DoES STORAGE REALLY COST?
TOWARDS A FULL COST ACCOUNTING MODEL FOR DATA STORAGE I (2013),
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destroy data in order to recycle storage media like hard drives and back
up tapes. If companies are unhappy using software that automatically
destroys or modifies their ESI, they can preserve that data with other
technology or use different software. In any event, such costs are a
business and technical expense that changes in discovery rules cannot
substantially reduce.
B. Costs ofPreserving Documents for Subsequent Litigation
Proponents of Rule 37(e) revisions use the term "over-preservation"
primarily to refer to costs of paying lawyers, executives, and technicians
to locate and preserve ESI that the companies would otherwise have
modified or destroyed, but keep to avoid incurring possible judicial
sanctions. 16 This preservation requires paying people to identify,
preserve, and retrieve ESI scattered around the company that would
otherwise be destroyed as part of ordinary computer operations. 17 The
Committee Report expressly attributes the increased costs of preservation
to judicial expansion of the duty to preserve ESI, particularly prior to
filing of litigation. 18 Corporate entities themselves describe their current
ESI preservation protocols as wasteful and unnecessary, and blame it on
the courts. 19
https://www.bjagov/bwc/pdfs/dutta-2013-full-cost-accounting-gecon.pdf; see also 5 Ways Cloud
Integrated Storage Reduces Costs, NASUNl, http://datastorageasean.com/sites/default/files/Nasuni
S-Ways-CiS-Reduces-Costs-wp.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (describing current cost saving
mechanisms that have led to a decline in ESI storage costs).
16. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, supra note 12
(describing fear that failure to preserve ESI might expose business entities to "serious sanctions").
17. Letter from Bruce Kuhlik, Exec. Vice-President & Gen. Counsel, Merck & Co., Inc., to
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Feb. I I, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentD
etail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1073 ("Merck generates, collects, and retains information for
specific business-rather than legal-reasons .... Documents and data responsive to discovery
orders are frequently scattered across a number of systems, many of which are designed and
maintained in different ways, and extracting these documents requires time, expertise, and money.").
18. See Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jetfiey Sutton, supra note
12 (explaining that entities spend "millions of dollars" preserving documents for "litigation that
may never be filed").
19. See Letter from Bruce Kuhlik to Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note
17.Merck's litigation hold system is "remarkably broad" and requires "significant resources." Id.
Inconsistent legal standards "force[]" the company "to comply with the strictest-and most
expensive-possible retention standard in an effort to avoid spoliation sanctions." Id; see also Robert
Levy et al., The Proposed Rules: Light at the End ofthe E-Discovery Tunnel, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNSEL, Oct. 2013, at I, 39 (noting companies must take "the most restrictive and extreme
approach as to what needs to be preserved. The result is preservation of documents at great expense
that are very unlikely to be used in litigation"); Letter from Lawyers for Civil Justice to Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.reguiations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC
RULES-CV-2013-0002-0267 ("A New Preservation Rule is Urgently Needed.").
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Recognizing that the costs of over-preservation are really the costs of
companies trying to comply with current law on ESI preservation, the
argument based on over-preservation is somewhat circular. Companies
argue that the law mandates wasteful and unnecessary preservation of
ESI, but what makes that preservation wasteful and unnecessary is their
own assertion that the law on ESI preservation is unnecessarily broad.
They could straightforwardly argue that the costs to them of current ESI
preservation law substantially outweigh the benefits to plaintiffs or the
civil litigation system. 20 That statement, however, is controversial and
contestable, not least by the judges who created, enforced, and expanded
the existing law ofESI preservation. 21
Another way to attack current preservation standards is to note that
much ESI preservation is done for "litigation that may never be filed."22
But if the preservation obligation attaches whenever litigation is
"reasonably anticipated," as it does under current case law, then some of
these results are inevitable.23 Not all "reasonably anticipated" events
actually occur. 24 Any loosening of preservation standards would permit
more ESI destruction in subsequently filed cases.
C. Costs ofLitigation Damage
For corporate defendants, the litigation damage caused by preserved
ESI may well be the hidden cost of "over-preservation." The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted the legality and ubiquity of "[d]ocument
retention policies" that destroy documents and are "created in part to keep
20. To be fair, many of the proponents of the 2015 discovery reforms have argued precisely
that. See Letter from Lawyers for Civil Justice to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra note 19.
The Advisory Committee, however, took a more equivocal position in expressly refusing to
change preservation law. See Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey
Sutton, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir.2011)
("declin[ing] to sully the flexible reasonably foreseeable standard" with a "restrictive gloss");
Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp.
2d 456, 461-<>2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]he courts have a right to expect that litigants and counsel
will take the necessary steps to ensure that relevant records are preserved when litigation is
reasonably anticipated, and that such records are collected, reviewed, and produced to the
opposing party. . . . [W]hen this does not happen, the integrity of the judicial process is
harmed ...."), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
22. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, supra note 12; see
also Letter from Kaspar Stoffelmayr, Vice-President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bayer Corp., to
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0309 (pointing out the low percentage of ES! Bayer
actually produced in pending litigation compared to the amounts preserved).
23. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, supra note 12.
24. This sentence was written the day after the Carolina Panthers (favored by 10 points)
lost to the Denver Broncos in Super Bowl 50.
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certain information from getting into the hands of others. "25 Proponents
of Rule 37(e) revisions rarely argued that their goal was to reduce
damaging litigation disclosures, although they surely knew that was a
likely result. 26 As a reason for revising Rule 37(e), however, the argument
is an obvious non-starter. It plays into the view of the discovery rules as
a zero-sum contest between plaintiffs' lawyers and corporate defendants,
and it highlights the unsettling fact that intentional ESI destruction is
perfectly legal before any preservation duty attaches but subject to severe
penalties thereafter.
II. A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO RULE 37(E)
A coherent account of the purpose of Rule 37(e) must consider
corporate agents and their relationship to risk, particularly the risk of
disobeying the law. It is a matter of some theoretical dispute whether
corporate managers ever have an obligation to break the law. Such agents
have fiduciary duties that require them to act in the "best interests" of the
corporation and its shareholders. 27 When substantial corporate benefits
may come from bending or breaking the legal rules and the penalties for
violations are small or the probability of detection is low, breaking the
law may well appear to be a managerial obligation. 28
25. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citing Christopher R.
Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction ofJustice
Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 725 (2003) ("[O]ne of the best reasons for having a
formal policy is that it reduces legal exposure through the destruction of possibly incriminating
evidence.")).
26. Levy et al., supra note 19, at 39 ("Keep in mind that the U.S. Supreme Court has
confirmed that it is appropriate to get rid of information as part of a records retention
policy .... LCJ's argument is not based on a desire to hide information, but rather to facilitate
normal business processes that are not going to be subject to the 'gotcha' game that often arises
in litigation.").
27. E.g., Aronson V. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810--11 (Del. 1984); see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(a) (2007).
28. Legal scholars have taken varying views on this issue. Progressive academics cite it as
a fundamental problem, encouraging corporate managers to adopt the perspective of the
Holmesian "bad man." See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAws & PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 73-7 4 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man"
Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1593, 1593-94 (2006). Many law and economics scholars, in contrast, view such cost-benefit
analyses as part of the wealth-maximizing role of the modem business corporation. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH.
L. REv. I I 55, 1168 n.36 (1982) ("Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating
regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm, because the sanctions set by the
legislature and courts are a measure of how much firms should spend to achieve compliance.").
Others have tried to carve out an intermediate position. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling
at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1609-10. (1995). For an overview of this debate, including its application to corporate
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There is no doubt many real-world corporate managers adopt a cost
benefit approach in determining whether to violate legal rules. There
appear to be "widespread" corporate violations of the labor laws
mandating overtime pay and prohibiting employment of undocumented
immigrants.29 The recent rapid growth of regulatory compliance
departments within corporations has further validated these strategies.
Just as document retention policies require consideration of what
documents to destroy,30 corporate compliance policies require corporate
managers to consider how much money, time, and effort should be spent
on promoting and enforcing various types of compliance. 31 These
managers must assess at least three different risks: (1) that a violation of
law will occur, (2) that the violation will be detected, and (3) the probable
penalty that will be imposed. 32
Imagine an associate general counsel in charge of supervising the
company's "information governance" system33 and ESI preservation
efforts. The last few years have not been easy. With the proliferation of
smartphones, Facebook pages, and employees uploading their files onto
the Cloud and then working at home (on who knows what device), the
amount of potentially relevant ESI being created and destroyed outside
the company's formal document retention system is large and growing,
and with that comes an increasing likelihood of serious violations of ESI
preservation obligations. Plaintiffs' lawyers are getting more
sophisticated about technology and making sure their discovery requests
cover smartphones and tweets and are even hiring legal tech firms. 34 The
document retention policies, see Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Undereriforced Laws:
Examining the Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 487, 488
(2009).
29. Ostas, supra note 28, at 491-93.
30. See, e.g., APPLIED DISCOVERY, LEXISNEXIS, DocUMENT RETENTION & DESTRUCTION
POLICIES FOR DIGITAL DATA 2 (2004), http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/
whitePapers/ADI_WP_DocRetentionDestruction. pdf.
31. Ostas, supra note 28, at 499-500 ("If economics drives the corporate decision, then
resources will be employed only up to a point where the marginal cost of compliance equals the
marginal benefit resulting from fewer instances of unlawful behavior, but not beyond. In other
words, there may be 'efficient' breaches even when the firm is committed to 'compliance."'
(footnote omitted)).
32. Ostas, supra note 28, at 50 I.
33. For a definition and description of such systems, see Philip J. Favro, Getting Serious:
Why Companies Must Adopt !reformation Governance Measures to Prepare for the Upcoming
Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. I, 25-39 (2014).

34. At least twenty state bars have adopted Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, requiring lawyers to keep abreast of changes in the law, including "relevant technology."
Robert Ambrogi, 23 Stales Have Adopted Ethical Duty of Technology Competence, LAW SITES
(Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2015/03/11-states-have-adopted-ethical-duty-of
technology-competence.html.
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likelihood of detection of such violations is substantial and increasing.
Finally, the courts are being uncooperative by refusing to define, in any
clear and predictable way, precisely when ESI preservation duties
commence. If a general counsel guesses wrong, a judge (frequently but
not exclusively a federal judge in a court within the Second Circuit)35 can
declare with 20-20 hindsight that the corporate client's work was
negligent and sock that client with sanctions that substantially increase
its cost to settle the case. The general counsel accordingly spends
increasing amounts of time and money preserving ESI, erring, as the
cost-benefit calculus and a lawyerly sense of caution demands, on the
side of ever greater monitoring and preservation. Senior executives of the
company complain that the legal department's costs are increasing every
year without any improvement in actual litigation results.
For lawyers facing such dilemmas, new Rule 37(e) will appear as a
mild improvement in their situation. They no longer have to worry quite
so much if the litigation hold notice is a few days late or if some
employees fail to understand exactly what it means. They can take longer
lunch breaks, stop obsessing over every dispute that might turn into a
lawsuit, and spend a little less money and effort ensuring that the
company fully and completely meets its ESI preservation obligations.
Or, as the economists might put it, by reducing the penalty a company
is likely to receive for negligent or grossly negligent ESI preservation,
the drafters of new Rule 37(e) have lowered the price of this behavior. 36
Companies will still try to prevent unlawful ESI destruction, of course. It
is still subject to less severe sanctions, harmful to the company's general
litigation posture, and likely to anger the judge, but as rational wealth
maximizers, corporate agents will not have the same incentive to engage
in the costly and zealous efforts they have come to think of as "over
preservation." On this view, new Rule 37(e) is a small but significant
victory for corporate defendants, one that reduces their preservation
obligations in practice, and one that will lead to somewhat less ESI bein�
preserved. The drafters of Rule 37(e) likely contemplated this result. 3
Lawmakers frequently attempt to adjust the deterrent effect of regulations

35. See SHJRA A. SCHEINDUN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE 570--75 (2d ed. 2012).
36. Cf Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine ls a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 15---16 (2000)
("Fines . . . are decided in a larger context, which for convenience we may define as a
game.... People ... bring to it a perception of the strategic situation they are facing.").
37. FED. R. Ctv. P. 37(e) 2015 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. Prior law
caused litigants to expend "excessive effort and money on preservation in order to avoid the risk
of severe sanctions ifa court finds they did not do enough."

580

Ft,ORIDA !,AW REVIEW

[Vol.69

by raising or lowering penalties for controversial activities. 38 Yet certain
aspects of new Rule 37(e) make it unique and require further discussion.
Most legal changes that lower the price of prohibited conduct reflect
a revised assessment that the harm of such conduct is not as great as
previously thought. 39 However, because Rule 37(e) is a trans-substantive
rule of procedure, it is very difficult to predict the harm that will result
from lowering the penalties for negligent destruction of ESL That harm,
or lack thereof, was a prominent part of the debate over Rule 37(e).
Corporate defendants sought to characterize the additional ESI being
preserved as marginal and implied that most of the cases calling for it
were nuisance suits. 40 Plaintiffs groups pointed out the devastating effect
that loss of critical evidence could have in major employment
discrimination, toxic tort, or products liability cases. 41 Because the
Federal Rules apply to an enormous number of different types of cases,
both characterizations are likely to be sometimes true.
One response might have been to provide for case-by-case analysis,
permitting judges to impose severe sanctions for especially harmful ESI
destruction in "exceptional circumstances," as old Rule 37(e) did. 42 But
even the small probability of a big sanction upsets the ex ante risk
assessments that new Rule 37 seeks to address. Accordingly, there is no
"exceptional case" exception. Rather, the Rule describes a bright line
between the conduct for which courts may impose severe sanctions and
that for which they may not. But the question of the amount of harm ESI
destruction can cause remains controversial and unresolved. 43 As we will
38. See, e.g., Tina Moore et al., NYPD to Stop Arrestingfor Minor Marijuana Possession, Will
Issue Tickets Instead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Nov. 11, 2014, 9:36 AM) http://www.nydailynews.com/

new-yorlc/nyc-crime/nypd-stop-arrests-low-level-marijuana-charges-source-article-1.2005222.
39. Id. Many argue that laws prohibiting conduct causing serious non-compensable harm
should not be subject to cost-benefit analysis at all. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
28, at 1168 n.36 (explaining how courts should not apply this analysis to laws involving "violence
or other acts thought to be ma/um in se").
40. See Letter from Lawyers for Civil Justice to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra
note 19 (describing cases like Silvestri v. General Motors Corp, 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001), a
products liability case in which failure to preserve non-ESI evidence led to substantial harm and
substantial sanctions as "rare" and "one-in-a-million").
41. See, e.g., Letter from Michael R. Hugo, First Vice-Chair, Am. Ass'n of Justice, to
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC
RULES-CV-2013-0002-2178.
42. There was perhaps a nod to these same concerns in the "proportionality" factor that
appeared in the Advisory Committee's original version ofrevised Rule 37(e). ADVISORY COMM.
ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMJTTEE ON CIVIL RULES APRIL 11-12, 2013, at
153-55 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2013-04.pdf.
43. In effect, new Rule 37(e) offers corporate managers a choice of three ESI
retention/destruction strategies: reasonable but not perfect (no sanctions), negligent (some less
severe sanctions), or intentional (severe sanctions). The drafters of the Rule likely assumed that
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see, it is likely to re-emerge as judges seek to assess the egregiousness of
a party's conduct in determining whether to infer intent in a particular
case.
Rule 37(e)'s bright line is also unusual because it does not prescribe
different penalties for different conduct, but for the same conduct taken
with different states of mind. This means that the assurance Rule 37(e)
offers corporate managers engaged in ESI preservation is necessarily
limited and tentative. With respect to certain tasks, like making sure the
company widely distributes the litigation hold notice and employees
adequately understand it, a manager can have confidence that reasonable
effort is all that the law requires and even mistakes will not invoke severe
sanctions. With respect to other preservation issues, this is far less clear. 44
Some managers may believe Rule 37(e) protects their company from
severe sanctions so long as they do not send out a "smoking e-mail"
explicitly ordering ESI destruction. Others may worry that any low-level
employee who intentionally destroys ESI will subject the company to
severe sanctions. As we will see, these beliefs are both likely wrong.
The biggest problem with a bright-line rule based on intent is
determining how it applies to entities that have no actual intent. Nothing
in Rule 37(e) nor the Advisory Committee Note sheds light on this issue.
Yet "[a]scertaining a party's intent is one of the most difficult
determinations that a judge makes. Imputing intent to an organization is
doubly problematic."45 Making sense of Rule 37(e) requires making
sense of the intent requirement, particularly with respect to corporate
organizations.
Ill. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE INTENT

Consider the following scenarios, all of which involve intentional
destruction of ESI and all of which occur within a corporate
organizational context:
I. General Counsel of Megacorp receives a letter from a former sales
employee alleging she was fired due to gender discrimination and
most corporate managers would choose to avoid sanctions altogether by adopting the first option.
But for some companies, the added ESI destruction entailed by negligent retention policies would
be sufficiently beneficial to the company's litigation posture to outweigh the cost of lesser
sanctions. Of course, one might consider conscious adoption of a policy of negligent ESI retention
an intentional act, but that is a question for the following Section.
44. Suppose counsel, confused by contradictory case law, tells employees they may
continue destroying relevant ESI because she believes preservation duties have not yet attached.
If a judge subsequently disagrees, will he find she made her prior order with culpable "intent," or
was it a merely negligent mistake? For an answer, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
45. Letter from James C. Francis IV, U.S. Magistrate Judge, United States Dist. Court for
the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_usdc _southern_district_of_new_york_jam
es_francis_1_10_14.pdf(commenting on the Advisory Committee's original draft Rule 37(e)).
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threatening suit. General Counsel immediately issues a litigation hold
notice informing all sales department employees of the potential lawsuit
and ordering them to cease destruction and preserve all documents and
ESI relevant to the former employee, her employment performance, and
her termination. A salesperson in that department (not the former
employee's boss or supervisor) receives the notice, realizes he has e
mails on his office computer and smartphone that are potentially relevant,
embarrassing to him personally, and potentially damaging to the
corporation in any lawsuit. In direct contravention of the General
Counsel's instructions, the salesperson deletes and overwrites the e-mails
so they cannot be recovered.
II. Same scenario as I, except before the salesperson destroys any ESI,
he discusses his plans for ESI destruction with a colleague. The colleague
sends an anonymous e-mail to the General Counsel stating, "One of the
salespeople may be misconstruing your notice about evidence
preservation. He thinks it is really an instruction to destroy bad evidence
before the case is filed. Please clarify." The General Counsel, believing
her notice was clear and distrusting anonymous e-mails, does nothing.
The salesperson subsequently deletes and overwrites the e-mails.
Ill. General Counsel receives the same letter as I but does not
immediately issue a litigation hold notice. Rather, aware that the law
regarding when preservation duties attach is complex, she asks outside
counsel to prepare a detailed memorandum of law discussing how the
courts might deal with this issue in the three jurisdictions where the
former employee is most likely to sue. After receiving that memo, she
spends another week reading it and many of the cases it cites. During this
time, she is aware that routine corporate document retention policies are
causing potentially relevant ESI to be destroyed. After four weeks, the
General Counsel issues the litigation hold, but due to her "somewhat
purposeful sluggishness," relevant ESI is lost.
IV. Littleco, a small but growing firm in the high tech sector, has no
consistent or routine document retention policies. The CEO has refused
to follow the advice of various legal tech and outside law firms that a well
planned and consistently applied program of information governance
would reduce Littleco' s potential litigation costs and help protect the
company in the event of a major lawsuit. The CEO thinks these sales
pitches are mostly hype and prefers to save costs and encourage
"creativity" by letting each department head make her own judgments
about ESI retention and destruction. When Littleco is sued for patent
infringement, its lawyers send out a timely litigation hold notice, but
distribution and enforcement within the firm is disorganized and
haphazard and relevant ESI is destroyed.
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In all of these cases, there are plausible arguments under prior case
law46 that the actions taken (or not taken) by corporate agents were taken
with "intent to deprive another party of the information's use" in
anticipated litigation. 47 Yet none involves a single culpable spoliator
whose intent may be readily attributed to the corporation.
The first scenario presents the straightforward question whether
intentional acts of an employee, taken within the scope of his
employment, can be attributed to the employer corporation even if those
intentional acts are unauthorized or in violation of express instructions. If
the ro gue employee's actions were treated as an ordinary common law
tort, intentional but unauthorized actions would very likely give rise to
corporate liability. The basic principle of respondeat superior states that
"[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its
employee acting within the scope of employment.',4 8 This rule generally
applies to intentional as well as negligent torts, even where the
employee's intentional actions violate express policies of the corporate
employer. 49 "Scope of employment" is the critical issue, and courts
generally do not find it where the employee is acting out of purely
personal motives. But in situations like Scenario I, where the employee
believes himself to be acting for the benefit of both himself and the
corporation, courts generally deem this conduct to be within the scope of
employment. 50
A number of cases have applied these principles to alleged spoliation
claims. In Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 51 Nucor sued its former employee,
claiming that when Bell left its employment for a job with SeverCorr
LLC, also a defendant, he misappropriated Nucor's trade secrets. 52 Bell
had intentionally destroyed or overwritten two forms of ESI: (1) a USB
drive he allegedly used to transfer Nucor files to his SeverCorr laptop;
and (2) data on his SeverCorr laptop itself. 53 Holding that "[o]rdinary
agency principles govern a party's responsibility for spoliation
committed by its employees," the Court held that destruction of the USB
drive was done outside the scope of Bell's employment and could not be
attributed to SeverCorr but the ESI destruction on the SeverCorr laptop
46. See infra notes 48-52 (Scenario Q, 69-73 (Scenario II), 76-81 (Scenario III), and l04--114 (Scenario IV) and accompanying text.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 7.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
49. See, e.g., Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 882-83 (Utah 1983) (finding fraud
by employee created vicarious liability of corporate employer although employee's actions were
"in complete violation of [the corporate defendant's] established policies and practices").
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 228(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
51. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 194---95.
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could. 54 Many other reported cases involve parties found culpable after
their agents destroyed relevant evidence, sometimes in violation of
express instructions to preserve. 55
Yet in some cases, particularly involving federal statutory torts, courts
have inte�reted the statutes in ways that limit application of respondeat
superior. 5 Similarly, most federal courts applying the sanctions
provisions of FRCP 37(e) 57 do not impute the intent of every spoliating
employee to the corporation, but look to the status and role of the
corporate agent involved. In Dupont v. Ko/on Industries 58 for example,
although there was clear and largely undisputed evidence of intentional
ESI spoliation by corporate employees acting within the scope of their
employment, the Eastern District Court of Virginia did not base its
finding of corporate "bad faith" exclusively or even primarily on that
fact. 59 It inquired further, noting that the spoliators were "key
employees" and one was in charge of the corporate division that was the
subject of the litigation. 60 It also found fault with the diligence with which
those in charge of ESI preservation had carried out their duties. 61 In the
recent case of GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc.,62 decided under new
Rule 37(e), the Delaware District Court found "bad-faith intent" by
Plantronics based on the actions of one "top-level Plantronics executive"
who deleted his own e-mails and instructed other employees to do so as
well, despite directly contradictory preservation instructions from other
Plantronics top executives and legal advisors. 63
54. Id. at 196. The court ultimately gave a jury instruction pennitting but not requiring
adverse inferences with respect to both defendants. Id. at 204.
55. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp, 271 F.3d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 2001 ); Bowman v.
Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 96-7871, 1998 WL 721079, at *4---{; (E.D. Pa Oct. 9, 1998).
56. Some federal courts have rejected application ofresporuleat superior to IOb-5 securities
claims. See, e.g., In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1997);
Converse, Inc. v. Norwood Venture Corp., No. 96 CIV. 3745 (HB), 1997 WL 742534, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. I, 1997); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584,
612-13 (D.N.J. 1996). The principle also does not apply to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
57. Rule 37(e) is, for most purposes, the equivalent of a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2012); Hanna v. Plumer 380 U.S. 460, 462-64 (1965).
58. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D. Va 2011).
59. Id. at 508.
60. Id. at 50 I.
61. Id. at 504-05; see also Selectica, Inc. v. Novatus, Inc., No. 6: 13-cv-l 708-Orl-40TBS,
2015 WL I 125051, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015) (finding the bad faith of a corporate employee
was not attributed to the corporation, but rather the corporation's culpability was based on "failure
to adequately instruct its employees to preserve evidence"); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
881 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2012)(finding ofculpable conduct by corporate defendant
not based on employees' failing to preserve ESI as instructed, but on Samsung failing to verify
that its "employees were actually complying with the detailed instructions").
62. No. 12-1318-LPS, 2016 WL 3792833 (D. Del. July 12, 2016).
63. Id. at *6-7, *13.
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This more nuanced approach to respondeat superior makes sense in
interpreting new Rule 37(e). A Rule designed to protect reasonable but
not perfect preservation efforts and reduce penalties for negligent
preservation would be severely undercut if the intent of any rogue
employee were automatically imputed to the corporate defendant.
However, unless the intent of some human agents can be attributed to the
corporate defendant, Rule 37(e) would absolutely bar imposing severe
sanctions on them. Both logic and prior case law suggest that the intent
of high-level corporate officers,64 as well as any agent supervising ESI
retention or discovery,65 is likely to be deemed corporate intent. 66
Scenario II presents a stronger case for severe sanctions. Not only is
the same rogue employee violating clear preservation instructions, but the
corporate agent supervising ESI preservation has chosen to ignore a "red
flag" warning that spoliation is imminent. 67 There is little doubt the
General Counsel's decision was mistaken and negligent, but was it made
with intent "to deprive another party of the information's use in the
litigation"?68 On the facts as stated, the answer is no. General Counsel
asserts she made a bad call because she thought her preservation notice
was clear and she dislikes anonymous e-mails. But she would say that,
wouldn't she? A suspicious plaintiffs' lawyer would argue that under
these facts (ignoring the general counsel's self-serving rationale), the
general counsel's more likely motivation for doing nothing was that she
wanted to deprive plaintiff of the use of the information.
This raises an important question. Must the requisite intent under new
Rule 37(e) be proven directly by, for example, testimony or prior e-mails
of the relevant employees, or can it be inferred from circumstantial facts
like selective destruction or the use of "scrubbing software"? The Rule

64. See Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. BC Tech., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (D. Utah
2011) (explaining actions of"largely upper management and executives"); Victor Stanley, Inc. v.
Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 531 (D. Md. 2010) (explaining bad faith of CEO imputed to
corporation).
65. See NuVasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB), 2015 WL
4479147, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (finding that corporate party "did not take adequate steps
to make sure that its employees complied with the litigation hold"), vacated on reconsideration
by 2016 WL 305096 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016); Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271
F.R.D. 429, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining the preservation duty ascribed to counsel
supervising discovery and managers of the business).
66. See Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart, 945 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(demonstrating court considered deletion ordered by head of Human Resources to be corporate
intent); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (explaining
intentional ESI deletion by plaintiff's supervisor imputed to defendant corporation).
67. See supra p. 582.
68. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e)(2).
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and Advisory Committee Note provide no guidance, 69 but case law is
fairly clear. Even among those courts that previously rejuired
"intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress the truth," 0 this
desire could be established indirectly by examination of the
circumstances surrounding the destruction of evidence, even when the
party claimed to be acting from more innocent purposes. 71 It is likely
these cases will continue to be good precedent in determining intent under
new Rule 37(e).
The general counsel also cannot claim that she failed to "act with
intent" because her inaction rather than action resulted in ESI
destruction. 72 Substantial case law holds that once a duty to preserve
arises, failure to carry out that duty effectively can give rise to sanctions. 73
The problem is finding evidence of intent. Prior cases generally involve
negligent or grossly negligent failures to preserve, perhaps because it is
very difficult to prove that a failure to act was intentional. 74 Yet here too
there must be circumstances under which ignoring "red flags" can give
rise to an inference of culpable intent. 75 If one anonymous e-mail is not
69. These authorities specify that prejudice from lost ESI can be inferred only from a
finding of intentional ESI destruction. However, they say nothing about whether the requisite
intent can be inferred from the nature and method of ESI destruction.
70. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004).
71. See id. at 748 (explaining that the selective preservation of evidence would give rise to
indirect examination); Blinzler v. Marriott lnt'I, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (1st Cir. 1996); Am.
Builders & Contractors Supply Co. v. Roofers Mart, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-19 (CEJ), 2012 WL
2992627, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2012) (intent inferred from timing of ESI destruction);
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007 WL 5110313, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
July 3, 2007) (describing use of scrubbing software as part of indirect examination). One can view
these cases as the application to ESI destruction of the well-established tort rule that intent can be
inferred from the natural consequences of an act. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 8A
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
72. See supra p. 582. Rule 37(e)(2) requires finding that a party "acted" with the requisite
intent, and some prior cases hold an element of proving bad faith is "an affirmative act causing
the evidence to be lost." Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07---60077-CIV, 2009 WL
3823390, at• 16 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009). Yet conscious decisions not to act can be described as
"actions" of a sort. It is particularly difficult to distinguish between action, inaction, and
intermediate degrees of "sluggishness" when analyzing ESI preservation and discovery efforts.
Accordingly, it is unlikely courts will rely much on an action/inaction distinction.
73. See, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012);
NuVasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB), 2015 WL 4479147, at *1-3
(S.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), vacated on reconsideration by 2016 WL 305096 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2016); Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., 685 F. Supp. 2d
456,466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin, 685 F.3d 135.
74. It is hard to believe someone "scrubbed" a hard drive by accident, see Ameriwood, 2007
WL 5110313, at *6 (explaining that scrubbed hard drive can show evidence of bad faith), but not
implausible that someone negligently failed to respond to an e-mail, see supra p. 582.
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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enough, what about three? What about a signed e-mail by the employee's
supervisor? Under sufficiently egregious circumstances, even inaction by
a relevant agent will give rise to an inference that the agent (and therefore
the corporation) acted with the requisite intent.
New Rule 37(e) effectively raises the bar for inferring intentional
dereliction of preservation duties. In practice, courts will confront a
variety of circumstances where corporate agents failed effectively to
carry out their preservation duties with varying degrees of egregiousness.
In virtually all these cases, the corporate agent will deny acting
intentionally, and courts will have to draw difficult lines between various
types and degrees of misconduct, subjecting only the worst to severe
sanctions.
This leads to Scenario III, where the general counsel, while ostensibly
carrying out her preservation duties, did so with "somewhat purposeful
sluggishness."76 The phrase is from Residential Funding Corp. v.
DeGeorge Financial Corp., the case new Rule 37(e) expressly
overruled. 77 The district court held that such production was not grossly
negligent nor in bad faith. 78 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
such delays might well meet either culpability level. 79 Prior to new Rule
37(e), many courts did not bother to fine tune their determinations of
corporate culpability, rather setting a floor such as "at a minimum,
grossly negligent" 80 or hovering between two culpability
76. See supra p. 582.
77. 306 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2002), superseded by rule, FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e), as recognized
in CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The Second Circuit
cited Residential Funding approvingly in its recent opinion reinstating Tom Brady's suspension in
the famous "detlategate" case. Nat'! Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'! Football League
Players Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527,544 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 106---07).
Some have criticized the court for doing so, but the court's citation there was perfectly appropriate.
See Zach Warren, 5 Cases That Address the E-Discovery FRCP Amendments.from Spring 2016,
LEGALTECHNEWS (June l, 2016), http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=l2027589527l2. The issue in
NFL Management was, in part, whether Tom Brady was subject to suspension under the National
Football League (NFL) players' agreement for, among other things, failure to cooperate with the
NFL's investigation. Nat'{ Football League, 820 F.3d at 542. The court cited Brady's purposeful
destruction ofhis cell phone as an example of his failure to cooperate. Id. at 544. In that context, the
court did cite Residential Funding for the proposition that "the law permits a trier of fact to infer that
a party who deliberately destroys relevant evidence . . . did so in order to conceal damaging
information from the adjudicator." Id. at 544 (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 106---07). This
statement is still true in that Rule 37(e)(2), while it does not require such a finding, does permit it
when the circumstances surrounding the deliberate destruction provide clear and convincing
evidence of such an intent. Moreover, the court in that case was not construing Rule 37, but the NFL
players' agreement adopted in 2014. Id. at 539. In that context, Residential Funding provides good
evidence of conduct that was, at the time, considered highly uncooperative.
78. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 105.
79. Id. at l 10-12.
80. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc ofAm. Secs., 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d
135 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377 (N.D. Ga.
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determinations. 81 Under new Rule 37(e), this imprecision will no longer
be feasible since so much turns on precise culpability findings. 82
CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 83 one of the fust cases decided
under new Rule 37(e), provides insight into how courts will approach
these issues. In that trademark infringement case, discovery revealed
irregularities in e-mails produced by the plaintiffs, three limited liability
companies (LLCs). 84 This led to an investigation by defendant's forensic
analyst, who found that relevant e-mails had been altered to substitute
false e-mail addresses and domain names. 85 The originals were then
deleted. 86 Forensic analysis detected the lost originals and concluded that
"the presence of the deleted emails is the result of intentional human
action, and not of an automatic or inadvertent computer process. "87
Defendant moved for sanctions. 88 Magistrate Judge James Francis held
that new Rule 37(e) would be applicable to that motion. 89 Recognizing
that corporate intent was central to the sanctions issue and that this intent
was largely an evidentiary issue, he held that Rule 37(e)(2) required
"clear and convincing" evidence of the prohibited intent.90 This is the first
2008) (finding that corporate defendant "at least minimally culpable"); In re NTL, Inc. Secs.
Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding conduct "at least grossly negligent").
81. See Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at ll0---12.
82. See Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp., No. l3-cv-04236-BLF, 2016 WL 2957133,
at •1, *3, •5 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016), where, although the plaintiff had a duty to preserve yet
"made no effort to preserve communications from customers or internal emails" and continued to
allow an outside vendor to automatically delete these documents, defendants only sought and the
court only ordered spoliation sanctions pursuant to F.R.C.P. 37(eXI). This appears to reflect an
absence of any evidence sufficient to establish 37(e)(2) intent. In Fiteq Inc. v. Venture Corp., No.
l3-cv-01946-BLF, 2016 WL 1701794, at •3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2016), the court did not decide
whether the spoliation justified 37(e)(I) or (e)(2) sanctions because plaintiff failed to prove that
the ESI was not "restored or replaced through additional discovery."
83. CATI, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
84. Id. at 491-92.
85. Id. at 492.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 493.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 496. Judge Francis also stated that the court had inherent authority to sanction
plaintiff's alleged conduct even if Rule 37(e) did not apply. Id. at 498, 501. This observation
seems to be in some tension with the statement of the Advisory Committee that new Rule 37(e)
"forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain measures should
be used." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. The positions
could be reconciled by interpreting the Rule to permit courts to use inherent authority to impose
sanctions other than those expressly limited by Rule 37(e). Since Judge Francis held that the Rule
was also applicable in this case, the court never directly addressed the issue.
90. CAT3, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 498-99 (recognizing that courts had been "divided" as
to the appropriate proof standard to apply to spoliation claims, Judge Francis based his holding
on three lines of precedent that applied higher evidentiary standards for sanctions (I) based on
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interpretation of burdens of proof under new Rule 37(e), and it is a
significant one. 91 Judge Francis is clearly seeking to establish a uniform
evidentiary standard for inferring intent in all Rule 37(e)(2) cases, and his
choice of the clear and convincing standard, while not mandated by either
the Rule or prior case law, is reasonable and consistent with those
authorities. The drafters of the Rule sought a high bar for imposing severe
sanctions and to prevent their capricious or inconsistent application.92
The stringent intent requirement was their chosen device for limiting
judicial discretion in this regard. A uniform clear and convincing standard
of proof helps realize those goals.
However, Judge Francis also understood that corporate intent
regarding lost ESI can, and in most cases will have to, be inferred from
objective but circumstantial evidence. 93 This was certainly the case in
CAT3, LLC, where the principal agents of the plaintiffs all denied they
had engaged in or knew of any attempts to tamper with the phony e-mails
and suggested the alterations were an unexpected result of switching to a
different e-mail system. 94 Judge Francis, noting that circumstantial
evidence may be accorded "equal weight" with direct evidence and can
be sufficient to meet any level of proof, independently analyzed the
evidence regarding the altered e-mails. 95 He found the conclusions of
defendant's forensic analyst to be "well-supported" while the alternative
account of plaintiffs' witnesses was "less than compelling. "96
Although it clearly imputes the intent of their agents to the plaintiff
LLCs, CAT3, LLC does not explain the basis of that imputation and
inherent judicial power, (2) that were punitive or case-ending, and (3) that required a finding of
bad faith).
91. The Advisory Committee Note leaves the determination of prejudice from lost ESI to
case-by-case determination by individual judges and gives them discretion in applying the burden
of proof on that issue. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
With respect to a finding of intent under 37(e)(2), however, where such a finding gives rise to a
presumption of prejudice, both the Rule and Notes are silent as to the appropriate burden ofproo(
92. See FED R. C1v. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (stating that
courts should "exercise caution" in imposing Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions); infra notes 138-140 and
accompanying text.
93. CAT3, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 500.
94. Id. at 493-95.
95. See id. at 499-501. Because the e-mail alteration in CAT3, LLC was relatively
sophisticated and hard to detect, both the forensic analyst and the court concluded it could not
have occurred inadvertently. Id. at 50 I. This illustrates a dilemma for future spoliators. If they use
sophisticated techniques for eliminating harmful ES!, they have greater likelihood of escaping
detection, but also greater likelihood that if the lost ES! is detected, culpable intent will be
inferred. Risk-averse spoliators may choose to "play dumb," allowing ES! to be lost through
routine and easily detectable deletion, which gives them plausible deniability in claiming the loss
was inadvertent.
96. Id. at 499.
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makes no finding as to who actually altered the e-mails. 97 Implicit in the
court's findings of fact, however, were determinations that the altered e
mails were the result of intentional action (not inaction) by someone with
knowledge of and some supervisory authority over plaintiffs' ESI
production. 98 These conclusions appear reasonable in CAT3, LLC, where
the parties concerned were small LLCs whose executive officers
supervised ESI production. 99
Scenario IV presents a situation where ESI is lost through inaction and
negligence rather than intentional action. 100 The executive's decision not
to spend money on information governance seems a far cry from any sort
of intent to deprive parties of the use of information. Yet implicit in this
scenario is the question whether certain parties have a legal duty to adopt
information governance and routine document retention policies, and
whether a failure to accept and act in accordance with that duty might, in
the most egregious circumstances, justify severe sanctions. While the
argument is far from a slam dunk, there are good reasons to think it might.
For the last ten years, the Federal Rules have sought to encourage
potential litigants to adopt these systems. 101 The Rule adopted in 2006
provided a powerful incentive by creating a safe harbor for ESI lost
through "routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system." 102 While that language is absent from the current Rule, the safe
97. See id. at 499-502.
98. Id. at 499-500.
99. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, CAT3, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 488 (No. I:14-cv0551 l(AT)(JF)), 2015 WL 6697844. All three LLCs shared a single address. Id. Their Director
of Information Technology (and 30(b)(6) witness) testified "that he would have been aware of
any such manipulation by others." CAT3, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 494. The court subsequently
dismissed the case based on a stipulation of the parties under which plaintiffs withdrew their
complaint and defendants withdrew their motion for sanctions and acknowledged that "neither
Plaintiffs nor any of their owners or agents engaged in any discovery misconduct or wrongdoing."
Joint Stipulation of Dismissal at I, CAT3, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 488 (No. 14-cv-0551 I), 2016
WL 1584011,at*I.
100. See supra pp. 583.
IO I. A recent survey found that 85% of respondents have a "records management program"
and that 80% of such programs include ES!. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS ET AL., COHASSET Assocs. &
ARMA INT'L, RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED
lNFORMATION (ESI) 7 (2012), http://www.cohasset.com/retrievePDF.php?id= l4. Out of the 950
records management professionals conducted in this survey, only 76% stated that they perform
records management within their organization. Id. at 2, 32. Since the survey was conducted among
members or participants in records management organizations, it likely undercounts those
companies with no records management personnel. Id.; see also Passlogix, lnc. v. 2FA Tech.,
LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 378,414 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing that the company had no "litigation
hold/document preservation policy").
102. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (2006) (amended 2015); see also Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248
F.R.D. 372,378 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding that safe harbor is not available when no routine system
is in place).
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harbor is not completely gone. Sanctions of any sort are only permitted
for ESI lost "because the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve
the information," and the Note makes it clear that "the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system would be a relevant factor"
in determining whether the preservation efforts were reasonable, as
would a party's "sophistication" and familiarity with litigation. 103 For
most managers of solvent businesses with good legal counsel,
particularly those frequently engaged in litigation, the advantages of
having a modem, well-run information governance system will be clear.
A business without such a system, or with a severely malfunctioning one,
is likely both to lose more ESI and to be exposed to 37(e)(l) sanctions
for failure to take reasonable preservation steps. 104 But 37(e)(l) sanctions
are likely to be relatively light, and rational wealth-maximizing managers
of some business entities could decide that the benefits of having ESI
sometimes disappear inexplicably might outweigh the costs.
The decision not to adopt or maintain an information governance
system may be an intentional act not to do something. Can such intent
subject a party to 37(e)(2) sanctions? There are some good reasons to
think it might. We have seen that egregious failures to carry out
preservation duties can give rise to an inference that the party is
deliberately seeking to prevent the opposing party from obtaining ESL 105
But what about before any preservation duty attaches? Can a party do
whatever it wants with respect to information governance, even if it
knows it is likely to face preservation obligations in the near future? Is
there a minimal pre-preservation obligation, at least for sophisticated
parties likely to be subject to future litigation, to at least preserve their
ability to respond effectively when preservation duties arise? If so, a
company that intentionally sabotages its ability to respond effectively
may have engaged in intentional action sanctionable under 37(e)(2). Any
contrary rule would encourage sloppy information management and
contravene the spirit and intent of contemporary e-discovery rules and
practice.
A 2016 case decided under new Rule 37(e) comes very close to
reaching precisely this conclusion. 0 'Berry v. Turner 106 involved a
103. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
I 04. Courts have rejected arguments that mere failure to follow an express document
retention policy can constitute culpable conduct absent an independent legal duty to preserve. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1162, 1164--65 (10th Cir. 2011).
105. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. Indeed, those cases involving failures
to preserve or make timely production can be viewed as indirectly punishing the failure to have
an effective information governance system.
106. Nos. 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 WL 1700403 (M.D. Ga Apr. 27,
2016).
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collision between a car and tractor-trailer truck. 107 Plaintiffs sought
discovery from the defendant truck owner, which consisted of both the
driver's logs and ESI regarding the truck's speed, location, and other
information that could be downloaded from a service called PeopleNet.108
There was testimony that when an accident occurred, defendant's practice
was to make one copy of the driver's log, print out any relevant
information from PeopleNet, and then place both in a manila folder. 109
Although defendant received a notice of the lawsuit and preservation
notice shortly after the accident, this manila folder was subsequently lost
when the custodian of that file moved to a different building.110 Although
there was no claim that the loss of the file itself was intentional, the court
found that "it is simply irresponsible to print a single paper copy of
information which one has a duty to preserve under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26."111
Furthermore, defendant ADM Trucking "had no written policy on the
proper procedure for preserving information that may be relevant in
foreseeable litigation."112 The judge held that this failure to have
reasonable document preservation policies in place required the
conclusion that defendants "acted with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of
the use of this information at trial" and that sanctions under 37(e)(2) were
therefore warranted. 113 One can argue that O 'Berry involved sanctions
for failing to safeguard the "single paper copy" once the litigation became
foreseeable and the preservation duty attached and is therefore
distinguishable from Scenario IV. However, the court's concern clearly
extended to the information preservation system in place even before
notice of the potential litigation was received. 114 Accordingly, 0 'Berry
illustrates the kind of reasoning that could lead a court to impose
sanctions simply for failure to maintain a reasonable information
governance system.

IV.

CORPORA TE INTENT UNDER CAREMARK

Although prior case law and legislative history provide some help in
interpreting new Rule 37(e)(2), difficult questions remain. Among them:
(1) whether conscious dereliction of a known duty to preserve or produce
ESI can constitute sanctionable "intent"; (2) if so, what kinds of conduct
leading to lost ESI can give rise to such an inference; and (3) are there
duties, before any particular litigation is reasonably foreseeable, to create
107. Id. at* I.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *4.
112. Id.
113. Id. at "'4.
114. Seeid.
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and maintain an effective information governance system and can
intentional failure to fulfill such duties give rise to 37(e)(2) sanctions?
This Essay looks to an unusual source for further insight into these
issues-Delaware corporate law, particularly cases dealing with
managerial duties to prevent wrongdoing by corporate employees. While
such cases are obviously not binding on federal courts, looking to them
for guidance is surprisingly helpful. Determining intent under Rule
37(e)(2) is largely a matter of analyzing the actions of corporate agents,
a subject on which Delaware courts are extremely knowledgeable.
Moreover, the specific problem these cases address, under what
circumstances courts can hold corporate management responsible for
wrongdoing by lower level employees, is similar to the 37(e) problem of
assessing culpability of managers for spoliation by lower level
employees. Finally, because of certain intricacies of Delaware corporate
law, in most cases courts can only hold corporate management liable for
failure to prevent employee wrongdoing in situations where courts deem
these managers to be acting in "bad faith," a standard that parallels the
intent requirement of Rule 37(e)(2). 115
The seminal Delaware case is In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation.116 In Caremark, directors of the company allegedly
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to detect wrongdoing by lower
level employees that ultimately led to corporate felony prosecutions and
payment of over $250 million. 117 In evaluating the strength of plaintiffs'
derivative claims, Chancellor William T. Allen considered whether there
could be director liability for "a loss [that] eventuates not from a decision
but, from unconsidered inaction." 118 These losses are most likely to
occur, he noted, from failing to monitor the enterprise to ensure
compliance with the law. 119 Although prior case law had suggested there
could be no managerial liability where managers neither knew nor had
reason to suspect wrongdoing, Chancellor Allen rejected that blanket
rule. 120 He noted that both Delaware and federal law, particularly the
federal Sentencing Guidelines, "offer powerful incentives for
corporations today to have in place compliance programs to detect
violations of law" and for directors to be sufficiently informed to carry
out their supervisory duties. 121 Directors therefore needed to create
"information and reporting systems ... that are reasonably designed to
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2015).
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 960----0 I.
Id. at 968.
See id. at 969-70.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 969-70.
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provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board . . . to reach
informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with
law and its business performance." 122 Losses caused by failure to institute
such a system could give rise to managerial liability. 123
Chancellor Allen stated that the standard for liability in these actions
was "quite high," requiring a "sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system" exists, but that such failure
would establish "lack of good faith." 124
Discovery law also creates "powerful incentives" for corporate parties
to monitor and supervise their ESI retention through information
governance policies, 125 much like the incentives to institute compliance
programs in Caremark. 126 An "utter failure" to assure a reasonable policy
of ESI governance and retention could similarly constitute "bad faith" or
culpable intent under Rule 37(e)(2). I27 As in Caremark, the standard for
imposing such liability would be high, requiring a "sustained or
systematic failure" to institute such a policy or to effectively implement
it.

122. Id. He goes on to note that the board has broad discretion in designing a policy, and in
language highly reminiscent of the Advisory Committee Note, warns that no compliance policy
will "remove the possibility" that corporate managers may "sometimes be misled or otherwise
fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation's compliance with the law." Id. All that
is required is a "good faith judgment" that the information system adopted is sufficient to satisfy
managerial responsibilities. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 971.
125. See Favro, supra note 33, at 6; Charles R. Ragan, Information Governance: It's a Duty
and It's Smart Business, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. I, 7, 34 (2013); Dean Gonsowski, Inside Experts:
Information Governance Takes the Stage in 20/2, INSIDE COUNS. (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/0 l /27/inside-experts-information-governance-takes-the-st.
126. Skeptics might note that, unlike a compliance program, which is designed to detect and
prevent wrongdoing, an information governance policy can be used to destroy ESI as well as
preserve it. But the real hallmark of both types of programs is to deveiop effective information
and communication within the organization, so that the company can effectively carry out its legal
obligations.
127. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. Prior case law dealing with badly planned or
administered ESI preservation policies generally find them to constitute gross negligence, but not
to "'rise to [an] egregious level,"' or the level of bad faith. Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Tech., LLC,
708 F. Supp. 2d 378, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Toussie v. Cty. of
Suffolk, No. CV0l-6716(JS)(ARL), 2007 WL 4565160, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007)); see
Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 571 (D. Utah 2012). Yet this language of
rising "levels" clearly presupposes that a complete and utter breakdown of these efforts could
meet that higher level of egregiousness.
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Because the claim in Caremark involved "inattention" by the board,
that case also provides insight into the problem of managerial inaction. 128
Caremark holds that failure to stop wrongdoing can give rise to liability,
but only from a "sustained or systematic" failure, not the result of a single
mistake. 129 Inaction can also give rise to a finding of "bad faith" or
culpable intent, but only when it is sufficiently egregious to infer that
management has made a conscious choice not to act and has not merely
been lazy or neglectful. 130 This also parallels Rule 37(e)(2)'s limitation
of severe sanctions to intentional conduct. 1 3 1
Cases applying Caremark suggest two types of situations where
managerial inaction can give rise to liability. 1 32 The first is failure to act
where managers have actual or constructive knowledge of specific "red
flags" indicating wrongdoing by lower level employees. These might be
detailed, third-party reports "suggesting potential accounting
improprieties" 133 or warning statements by governmental authorities. 134
One case even discusses how visible the "red flags" must be to senior
management. 135 The other potential basis for liability is failure to create
a managerial group to monitor employee misconduct or "patently
inadequate" performance by such a group. 136 Federal courts applying
Delaware law have also found actionable claims based on such
managerial inaction. 1 37
128. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
129. Id.
130. See O'Berry v. Turner, Nos. 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 WL
1700403, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2016).
131. This also resolves the prior hypothetical about the lawyer who makes a mistake in
ascertaining the trigger date. See supra note 44. So long as it is not a sustained and systematic
failure to preserve relevant ESI, it would not give rise to severe sanctions.
132. Indeed, after finding that its existing standard for determining when derivative cases
could proceed without making a demand on the board was inadequate to deal with cases where
there was an "absence of board action," the Delaware Supreme Court created another standard in
Ra/es v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993), which is applicable to cases of managerial
inaction. Most of the cases cited in this Section apply the Ra/es standard.
133. In re China Auto. Sys. Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 7145-VCN, 2013 WL 4672059, at *8
(Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *15
(Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000)).
134. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 806 (7th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the failure to act after senior management received two Warning Letters from the
FDA).
135. In re Citigroup Inc. S 'holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch.
June 5, 2003) (finding that red flags must be "visible to the careful observer").
136. In re China Agritech Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL
2181514, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (discussing defendant's "systematic lack of
oversight"); In re China Auto., 2013 WL 4672059, at *7-8 (discussing defendants' inadequate
oversight of accounting practices); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492,507 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(discussing bases for liability under Caremark).
137. In re Abbott labs., 325 F.3d at 808--09; McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808,817 (6th Cir.
2001); see also In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. CVI0--06576 MMM
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Under Delaware law, corporate managers are often exempt from
monetary damages for claims involving negligent or even grossly
negligent misconduct but are subject to damages if the wrongdoing
involves intentional misconduct or actions taken in bad faith. 138 In Stone
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 139 the Delaware Supreme Court
applied these principles to claims of inadequate board supervision. 140
Endorsing the basic Caremark framework, the Court stated that in the
absence of "red flags," Caremark liability could only be imposed when
"(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention." 141 The court made clear that this liability involves a
"conscious disregard" by managers of their responsibilities, a "showing
that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations." 142 A similar showing that corporate agents or managers
knew they were not meeting the company's ESI preservation
responsibilities would constitute the requisite culpable intent under Rule
37(e).
Applying these concepts to determination of intent under Rule 37(e)
would create an evidentiary standard under which claims for lost ESI
seeking severe sanctions, while potentially available, would rarely
succeed. These claims would require a showing that senior executives or
those supervising discovery had either failed to act while having actual
or constructive knowledge of "red flags"--credible warnings that
corporate preservation duties were being violated-or that they "utterly
failed" to set up a system for ESI retention and preservation or exhibited
a "sustained and systematic" failure to effectively utilize that system.
These claims will be difficult to impossible to prove against a well
advised corporate party who adopts and maintains a reasonably effective
policy of information governance and ESI retention.
(RCx), 2012 WL 9506072, at *25 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) ("[Tihe critical inquiry is whether
board members had actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful conduct in question, and
failed to take the steps to rectify it.").
138. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2015) (permitting exculpatory provisions
eliminating director liability for money damages for breach of fiduciary duty but not "for acts or
omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation oflaw");
see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-<i7 (Del. 2006) (explaining the
distinction between "gross negligence" and "bad faith," and citing the intentional failure "to act
in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for [one's] duties" as a
"nonexculpable, nonindernnifiable" example of bad faith).
139. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
140. Id. at 369-70.
141. /d.at 370,373.
142. Id. at 370.
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That, of course, is precisely the point. The Delaware law of
managerial oversight is designed not only or even primarily to punish
egregiously misbehaving corporate managers. It is also designed to set
minimal standards of conduct for corporate managers who are trying to
carry out their supervisory duties conscientiously and reasonably fear
litigation. The most important enforcement of these laws takes place not
in courts but in corporate lawyers' offices, as they explain to their clients
what needs to be done to minimize the danger of such lawsuits. Rule 3 7 (e)
will make sense if it encourages corporate counsel and ESI managers to
adopt reasonable standards for ESI preservation and to respond
effectively to e-discovery obligations.

